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Abstract 
 
This paper consider Tunisian banks case study over the period 2005–2014. The 
long run comparison analysis based on t-test between interest-free banks (IFB) 
and conventional banks (CB) of bank specific factors indicates that there are 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks behavior. CB are found to be 
more stable, while IFB have better liquidity and are riskier than CB. In long run, 
It is found alo that 2011 Yesameen  revolution has negative effect on CB stability 
and 2008 GFC has positive effect on IFB stability. This paper investigates also 
the short run stability question based on dynamic model for Z-score ratio of 
tunisian banks during the same period. The paper finds that the level of Z-score 
can be attributed to both macroeconomic conditions and banks’ specific factors. 
Z-score is found to respond in short term to macroeconomic conditions. Z-scores 
tends to increase when Interest rate (INTER) and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) rise. While instability increase when Unemployment rises, Exchange rate 
depreciates, and Inflation is high. It is found alo that in short run, 2011 Yesameen 
revolution and 2008 GFC have a significant positive effect on tunisian bank 
stability.  
 
JEL classification:  E32 E44 G01 G21 G32 Z12.  
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tunisian revolution, Tunisia, Islamic bank (IB), conventional bank (CB), macroeconomic 
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I. Introduction 
 
The emergence of interest-free finance can be traced back to 1963 in Egypt, while 
its importance comes to the global financial system only after the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) occurred in 2008.2 Islamic banking and finance is one of the fastest 
growing segments of the global banking industry and has risen to prominence 
recently through its distinctive characteristics. This rapid growth of interest-free 
banking system has attracted the attention of many international policy makers 
and academic researchers. While most previous studies on interest-free finance 
have investigated and explained the general Islamic principles and the instruments 
used in Islamic banking, recent researches have investigated whether profitability, 
stability, efficiency, and risks differ significantly across interest-free and 
conventional banks (CB). 
Islamic banking is different from the conventional banking as it is interest free. 
Islamic banking operates under different principles and they have different risk 
profiles.3  The interest-free banks have regulations of two types; first is the 
government and the central bank that govern the conventional banks and second 
is the Shariah Supervisory Board that approves the products of the Islamic banks 
and keeps a check over the implementation of the rules defined by the board.4 The 
central bank defines some rules which are specific to the Islamic banks (IB).5  
                                                          
2 The tunisian Islamic banking is working with the simple profit and loss sharing accounts, 
Islamic savings and investment products but it does not yet introduce the Islamic bonds (Sukuk) 
and hedge funds in the market as done in other countries. 
3 Islamic financial system is based upon a commerce law known as fiqh al-mu’amalat. This law 
considers issues of social justice, equity, and fairness in all business transactions, and promotes 
the entrepreneurship, protects the property rights and emphasizes the transparency of 
contractual obligations according to divine law of Allah and his last messenger Muhammad 
(PBUH صلى الله عليه وسلم≡ ). It is based on Shariah approved products which do not involve Riba 
(interest/usury), gharar (uncertainty), maisir (gambling), and non-halal (prohibited) activities. 
4 The Committee is responsible for supporting the bank in the implementation, supervision and approval 
of all products according to the principles of Islamic finance (Taktak & Zouari, 2014). 
5 Although Islam has allowed the profits, but the pre-determined fix amount of returns is not 
allowed. Risk of loss and variability of profits must be faced to get the returns (Ariss, 2010). 
The main products of Islamic banks are now based on profit and loss sharing principle 
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There is no doubt that interest-free financial sector development plays an 
important role in the overall development and stability of an economy. In regard 
to financial stability, the theory and practice of Islamic banking do not give a clear 
answer concerning whether interest-free banks should be more or less financially 
stable than traditional banks. Although, there are many empirical studies that 
examined the relationship between banking sector and financial stability, but 
specific empirical studies on the relationship between Islamic banking and 
economic stability factor post the global financial crisis and the 2011 Yasameen  
revolution are not too many. To help in filling this gap in empirical literature, 
this study attempts to examine empirically the relationship between Islamic 
banking, conventional banking, and economic stability in Tunisia pre and post the 
2008 global financial crisis and the 2011 Yasameen  revolution.    
 
However, empirical studies investigating the financial stability of IB are still 
limited ( see (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013); (Beck, Demirguc -Kunt, & 
Merrouche, 2013); (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013); (Čihák & Hesse, 2010); (Rajhi & 
Hassairi, 2013),  (Alqahtani & Mayes, 2018)). 
 
The literature identifies two sets of factors to explain the evolution of bank 
stability over time. One group focuses on external events such as the overall 
macroeconomic conditions, while the second group, which looks more at the 
variability of Z-scores across banks, attributes the level instability to bank-level 
factors. Empirical evidence, however, finds support for both sets of factors. 
GDPG and INFlation rate are considered in some papers [see (Abedifar, 
Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013), (Johnes & al., 2013), (Louhichi & Boujelbene, 2016), 
(Ibrahim, Aun, & Rizvi, 2017), and (Doumpos, Iftekhar, & Fotios, 2017)]. The 
impact of INFlation, however, may be ambiguous. Indeed, higher inflation can 
                                                          
(Mudarabah), partnerships or joint ventures (Musharakah), Sales contract (Salam), leasing 
contract (Ijarah) and interest-free loans (Qard-e-Hasna), trade with markup (Murabaha). 
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make debt servicing easier by reducing the real value of outstanding loan, but on 
the other hand, it can also reduce the borrowers’ real income when wages are 
sticky.6 Other macroeconomic variables, which were found to affect banks’ asset 
quality, include the exchange rate and  interest rate. In this regard, exchange rate 
depreciation might have a negative impact on asset quality7 and interest rate 
hikes affect the ability to service the debt, particularly in case of floating rate loans 
(Louzis, Vouldis, & Metaxas, 2010). 
 
The objective of this study is twofold. First, our study investigates the differences 
between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of financial characteristics 
[profitability ratios (ROA, and ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD), credit risk 
(LLR, NPL, LTA, LTD), insolvency risk ( DTA), Reglementary risk (CAP), and 
asset structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA)]. Univariate descriptive analysis based on t-
test is then considered for the long run comparison. Second, the study aims to 
evaluate the determinants of stability in Tunisia banking system by looking at both 
bank-level data and macroeconomic indicators [GDPG, Inflation, Interest rate, 
Exchange rate, Foreign direct investment (FDI), and unemployment rate] over 
2005-2014. Dynamic regression specification is then considered for short term 
stability evolution. 
 
This study proceeds as follows: After a brief introduction (section I), section II 
describes the data, defines different ratios used in the study, and gives a 
descriptive comparative study between interest-free banks and conventional 
banks in the long run. Section III presents methodology of dynamic regression 
model to evaluate the determinants of stability, while Section IV discusses results 
                                                          
6 In countries where loan rates are variable, higher inflation can also lead to higher rates 
resulting from the monetary policy actions to combat inflation ( (Nkusu, 2011).  
7 Particularly in countries with a large amount of lending in foreign currency to un-hedged 
borrowers. 
5 
 
for stability analysis in the short run. Section V concludes with a discussion of 
implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
II. Data and variables : Long run Descriptive univariate 
comparison analysis  
 
Our sample contains 16 banks (14 conventional and 2 Islamic). List of tunisian 
banks is given at Appendice, see  Table A 1 . We have 160 observations, or  bank-
years of data, for banks operating in Tunisia for the calendar years 2005–2014. 
There are 140 observations for conventional banks (CB) and 20 observations for 
Islamic banks (IB). 12 financial ratios are used in this study. All are defined in 
Table 1. we classify these ratios into six general categories: profitability ratios 
(ROA, and ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD),8 credit risk (LLR, NPL, 
LTA, LTD), insolvency risk ( DTA), Reglementary risk (CAP), and asset 
structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA).9 To ensure that our results were not driven by 
the presence of some outliers, we do correct all variables (we did not eliminate 
extreme values).10  
 
Six macro economic variables are considered in this study : Gross Domestic 
Product Growth (GDPG), inflation rate (INF), Foreign direct investment (FDI), 
Exchange rate (Exrate), Interest rate (INTER), and Unemployment rate (Unemp). 
                                                          
8 Liquidity means how quickly a bank can convert its assets into cash at face value to meet the 
cash demands of the depositors and borrowers.  
9
 Regarding the later ratios, we use fixed assets to assets ratio, and off-balance sheet items to 
assets ratio to account for the operating leverage, and off-balance sheet activities, respectively. 
These ratios are used in the previous empirical banking literature (see, (Srairi, 2010) and (Ben 
Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015)). 
10
 To control for the remaining outliers, we’ll use a robust estimation technique (an alternative 
method) as a superior estimation method, less sensitive to outliers, proposed by (Rousseeuw, 
Hampel, Ronchetti, & Stahel, 1986).  
6 
 
Figure 1 illustrates evolution of GDP, INF, △FDI, △EXRATE, △UNEMP, and 
INTER. Each of All these vriables has stationary pattern. 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
 39
 - 0
5
 39
 - 0
6
 39
 - 0
7
 39
 - 0
8
 39
 - 0
9
 39
 - 1
0
 39
 - 1
1
 39
 - 1
2
 39
 - 1
3
 39
 - 1
4
INF GDPG DEXRATE
DFDI DUNEMP INTER  
Figure 1: Tunisian Macroeconomic variables evolution from 2005 to 2014.11  
The present study is confined to the stability comparison between two types of 
banking, that is, interest-free and conventional banking. For this purpose, two 
interest free banks, i.e.  Zitouna Bank and Elbaraka bank are considered in the 
study for the comparison of their performance with conventional banks of Tunisia 
during the year 2005–2014. The importance of this period is higher because it 
shows the performance of the banks post the recession (global financial crisis, 
GFC  2008) period and the 2011 Yesameen revolution. So, the results will depict 
the impact of these crisis on both types of banking.  
The research employs the Z-score variable for comparison of stability between 
the both types of banking. The dependent variable : Z-score is calculated as:12 𝑍it = ROAit+(EQ/TA)itσROA      
                                                          
11 DEXRATE ≡ △EXRATE, DFDI ≡ △FDI, and DUNEMP ≡ △UNEMP. 
12 This measure has been used in a vast body of literature ( (Boyd & Runkle, 1993); (Čihák & 
Hesse, 2007); (Iwamoto & Mori, 2011); (Laeven & Levine, 2009); (Lown, Osler, Sufi, & 
Strahan, 2000); (Maechler, Worrell, & Mitra, 2007) ; and (Alqahtani & Mayes, 2018)). 
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where, ROA is the standard measure of return on asset, Equity to Assets ratio 
(ETA= EQ/TA), and σROA is the fluctuation of ROA indicated by the standard 
deviation. zscore indicates the number of standard deviation that a bank's return 
on asset has to drop before it evaporates bank's equity capital. Or in other words, 
Z-score indicates the multiple of a bank's equity buffer before it falls into the 
state of default. In this sense, the higher the Z-score is the lower is the bank's 
default risk. 
Table 1: Definition of variables13 and expected signs14 for Z-score. 
Ratios Definitions Expected sign 
for Zscore 
Profitability   
ROA Return on assets = Net income/Total assets + 
ROE Return on equity = Net income/Stockholders’ 
equity 
+ 
Liquidity   
CTA Cash to assets = Cash/Total assets 
- 
CTD Cash to deposits = Cash/Total customer deposits 
- 
Credit risk   
LLR Loans loss reserves to gross loans 
- 
NPL Non-performing loans to gross loans 
- 
LTA Loans to assets = Loans/Total assets 
- 
LTD Loans to deposits = Loans/Total customer deposits 
- 
Reglementary risk  
 
CAP Capital adequaty ratio + 
Insolvency risk   
DTA Deposits to assets = Deposits/Total assets 
- 
Asset structure   
FAA Fixed assets to assets = Fixed assets/Total assets 
 
OBSIA Off-balance sheet items to assets = Off-balance 
sheet items/Total assets 
 
Dummies and 
Interactions 
  
IB≡M Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is (interest 
free), 0 otherwise (i.e. Conventional banks (CB)) 
- 
                                                          
13
 We have not yet explained how certain ratios are calculated for Islamic banks. (Turen, 1995) provides an 
excellent explanation of the differences between Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
14 (Ben Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015). 
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M*2008 Interaction terms between the Islamic bank (IB) and 
post 2008 GFC period 
 
D2008 Dummy variable equal to 1 if year ≥ 2008 (post 
GFC period) 
 
D2011 Dummy variable equal to 1 if year ≥ 2011 (post 
Yesameen revolution period) 
 
Bank caracteristics 
  
Size15 Log(Total asset)  
DBS Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank is large (size > 
median), 0 otherwise 
 
Large_IB Inetraction term between large bank and islamic 
bank.16 
 
Macro-economic 
variables 
  
GDPG Gross Domestic Product Growth (annual % change)  
INF Annual country inflation rate in percentage measured by 
annual % change in consumer prices 
 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
 
EXRate Exchange rate 
 
INTER Interest rate 
 
Unemp Unemployment rate 
 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
in the study. Descriptive statistics present the general statistics of the variables. 
The statistics gives the mean value, standard deviation value for each group of 
banks, and Difference t-test p-value between two means of each variable (mean 
for IB and for CB). Difference is significant for LTA, LTD, and Z-score.  
Conventional banks have higher Z-score (are more stable).17 
 
The risk ratios indicate some important differences in operational characteristics. 
Interest free banks (IFB) extend more loans or equivalents relative to deposits 
(LTD) than conventional banks. The difference is significant at the 5% level and 
may  suggest greater risk for Interest free banks. 
                                                          
15 It is found in the literature that the size is measured either by the amount of loans or assets (Miah & 
Uddin, 2017). 
16
 Give a dummy variable equal to 1 if islamic  bank is big, 0 otherwise (small bank). 
17 The probability that a  banking system defaults is measured by the z-score. A higher z-score implies 
a lower probability of insolvency, indicating that the banking sector is more stable. The z-score (or 
distance to default) is a ratio, defined as((ROA + (equity)/assets))/sd(ROA), where ROA is average 
annual return on end-year assets and sd(ROA) is the standard deviationof ROA. 
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In contrast, the liquidity ratios are not significantly different between types of 
banks, but Interest free banks keep less cash relative to deposits and more relative 
to assets than conventional banks. The deposit to asset ratio (DTA) in everage for 
the Interest free banks was 4.2% which is lower than 12.17% ratio of 
Conventional banks. This supports the better liquidity performance for the 
Interest free banks. 
The asset-quality indicators reveal littel additional differences between Interest 
free and conventional banks. The LLR (Loans loss reserves To gross loans) ratio 
is higher (not significantly at the 10% level) for Interest free banks. Conventional 
banks  maintain smaller reserves for loan losses, but the interpretation is not clear. 
For example, Ijara and various Islamic leaseback schemes may involve more risk 
than conventional loans, so more reserve is needed. Alternatively, Interest free 
banks may be operating with lesser risk because they maintain higher 
contingency reserves for bad loan-like products.  
From a brief look at Figure 2 , we conclude that : Z-score average evolution from 
2005 to 2014 for islamic banks (IB) is different from one’s of conventional banks 
(CB). The pattern of latter path is decreasing from 2012 (post 2011 Yesameen 
revolution) while the former has an increasing path from 2009 (post GFC). CB 
have higher Z-score in mean than IB during period of study. 
From Figure 3 , mean of Zscore comparisions in different dimensions say that: 
IB are less stable than CB, Large IB are more stable than Small IB,18 Large CB 
are more stable than Small CB, all Banks are less stable Post GFC 2008 and Post 
TUNisian Revolution 2011, and Islamic Banks are less stable Post GFC 2008. 
Between year comparison show that Zscore in mean has its lowest value at 2013, 
                                                          
18 A bank is said to be large if its size > median, 
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and between tunisian banks (ID) ,19 41≡ Banque Nationale Agricole is the more 
stable bank while 54 ≡ Banque Franco-Tunisienne is the less stable bank.20  
Regarding the insolvency risk, evidence shows that leverage, as measured by 
Deposits (or Dept) to assets ratio (DTA), there is some difference in some 
spaces. Figure 4 gives a sum up of insolvency risk (DTA) in average 
comparisions in different dimensions. It say that: IB (and Small_IB) have better 
liquidity performance than CB and Post GFC 2008 (than Large_IB), while 
Large_CB have better liquidity performance than Small_CB. All Banks have 
better liquidity performance Post TUN Revolution 2011 but not Post GFC 2008. 
Between year comparison show that DTA in mean has its lowest value at 2013, 
and between tunisian banks (ID) 54 Banque Franco-Tunisienne is the worst bank 
in term of liquidity performance. 
From Figure 5 and Figure 9 (see Appendice), Z-score exhibit negative 
correlation with DTA and DTA
-1.21 Z-score is then strongly linearly related to 
DTA
-1. Z-score and DTA average evolution for All banks is illustrated at Figure 
7 (see Appendice). Both variables have decreasing trend (from 2010 for DTA and 
from 2012 for Z-score). Z-score and DTA average evolution for each type of 
banks is illustrated at Figure 8 (see Appendice). In averge there is no difference 
                                                          
19
 39 ≡Albaraka Bank Tunisia, 40 ≡Banque Internt Arabe Tunisi, 41≡ Banque Nationale Agricole, 42 
≡Société Tunisienne de Bank, 43 ≡Amen Bank, 44 ≡Banque de l'Habitat, 45≡ Attijari Bank, 46 ≡Arab 
Tunisian Bank, 47≡ Banque de Tunisie, 48≡ Union Internl de Banque, 49≡ Union Bancaire Comrce et 
l'Industrie, 50≡ North Africa International Bank – NAIB, 51≡ Arab Banking Corporation – Tunisie, 52 
Banque Zitouna, 53 ≡Alubaf International Bank, 54 ≡Banque Franco-Tunisienne. 
20 Code for each bank is as follow : 39 Albaraka Bank Tunisia, 40 Banque Internt Arabe Tunisi, 41 
Banque Nationale Agricole, 42 Société Tunisienne de Bank, 43 Amen Bank, 44 Banque de l'Habitat, 45 
Attijari Bank, 46 Arab Tunisian Bank, 47 Banque de Tunisie, 48 Union Internl de Banque, 49 Union 
Bancaire Comrce et l'Industrie, 50 North Africa International Bank – NAIB, 51 Arab Banking 
Corporation –Tunisie, 52 Banque Zitouna, 53 Alubaf International Bank, 54 Banque Franco-
Tunisienne. 
21 Figure 6 in Appendice gives time evolution of each of these variables for each tunisian bank.  
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in evolution of these variables between two type of banks. However, difference is 
depected in magnitude of these means. Conventional banks have higher means. 
 
To summarise, it can be seen from this comparison that there are some differences 
between Interest free and conventional banks (as well as different size groups) in 
terms of their stability and operations. However, it is premature to draw any 
conclusion based on these results alone. Therefore, we will extend our 
investigation by implementing the regression analysis methodology and to 
investigate the effect of economic turmoil on Tunisian banks. 
All the variables under the study must be stationary otherwise spurious regression 
may be found. Henceforth, Levin, Lin & Chu, ADF - Fisher Chi-square, and PP - 
Fisher Chi-square Unit Root Tests for PANEL data have been implemented to 
ensure that all the bank specific variables in the regression equation are stationary. 
The result is shown in Table A 6 (see Appendice). All considered bank specific 
variable are stationary. Unit root tests results for Macroeconomic series (given 
also at Table A 6) are not fiable since PP and ADF tests for time series are 
asymptotic tests and we need at least 30 observations for each variable (we have 
only 10 observations for each series). However, from Figure 1, we conclude that 
INF, GDPG, and INTER are stationary series in level, while Exrate, FDI, and 
Unemp are stationary series in first difference. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the entire dataset, for IB and CB.  
 
Nber. of  Standard 
   
 
obs. Mean deviation IB CB 
Difference t-test 
p-value 
ROA 123 .0031492 .0561079 .0254133 .000518 0.1309 
ROE 122 .1236556 .4625882 .0565899 .1309718 0.5989 
CTA 122 .0392261 .0564197 .0605664 .0368981 0.1686 
CTD 118 .0529417 .088573 .0357429 .0545342 0.5233 
LTA 124 .5671394 .2393439 .4652975 .582227 0.0680 
LTD 124 .9191758 .4953456 1.168744 .8822028 0.0302 
12 
 
LLR 78 .1326936 .1000929 .1539838 .1271994 0.3432 
NPL 43 .1711651 .2612057 .1357429 .1780528 0.6999 
CAP 122 .106693 .1333503 .1436303 .1026635 0.3142 
DTA 122 .1139159 .1759551 .0420362 .1217573 0.1368 
Zscore 122 26.4649 24.53635 1.825296 29.15286 0.0002 
 
0
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Figure 2 : Z-score average evolution for CB and IB from 2005 to 2014. 
 
Figure 3: Mean of Zscore comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, Pre vs 
post TUNisian Revolution of 2011 for all Banks, between year, and between tunisian banks 
(ID).22    
                                                          
22
 Note :  IB=1 if the bank is an islamic one, Large_IB=1 if IB is large and zero if not. Large_CB=1 if 
CB is large and zero if not. D2008=1 for post GFC, D2011=1 for post 2011 revolution, IB2008=1 for 
IB post GFC, year=mean of Z-score for each year, ID= mean of Z-score for each bank. For all, if not 
indicator variable take value zero. A bank is said to be large if its size > median, 
13 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean of DTA comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, Pre vs 
post TUNisian Revolution 2011 for all Banks, between year, and between tunisian banks (ID). 
23   
 
Figure 5: Z-score and the DTA (DTA
-1) linear static relation in Tunisia conomies, 2005-
201424 
 
 
III. Methodology : Short run dynamic stabilty sensitivity. 
 
Our dependent variable to evaluate financial stability is the well-known Z-score 
ratio. It has also been used in the literature relating to Interest free banking (see 
                                                          
23
 Note :  IB=1 if the bank is an islamic one, Large_IB=1 if IB is large and zero if not. Large_CB=1 if 
CB is large and zero if not. D2008=1 for post GFC, D2011=1 for post 2011 revolution, IB2008=1 for 
IB post GFC, year=mean of DTA for each year, ID= mean of DTA for each bank. For all, if not indicator 
variable take value zero.  
24
 DTA L ≡ DTA
-1. 
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Table A 2), and (Čihák & Hesse, 2010)  suggest that it is appropriate to use with 
respect to Interest free banking. 
The Pearson correlation test reveals the correlation among the variables.25 The test 
result shows positive relation relationship of Z-score with Return on equity 
(ROE), Capital adequaty ratio (CAP), Size, and Fixed assets to assets (FAA). It 
implies that Z-score will be increased with increase of the Return on assets 
(ROA), CAP, Size, and FAA. The opposite relationship is found between Z-score, 
Debt to assets (DTA) and Off-balance sheet items to assets (OBSIA). Results of 
the Correlation analysis between CAP and ROA, Loans to assets (LTA), Loans 
to deposits (LTD), and Loans loss reserves to gross loans (LLR) depict positive 
significant coefficients. The opposite is true for the relation between CAP and 
ROE, Cash to assets (CTA), and Cash to deposits (CTD). Significant strong 
relationship is found among the exogenous variables in the correlation matrix. So 
it can not be assumed that the data set is free from Multicollinearity problem (see 
Table A 4 in Appendice). From Table A 4,26 and to avoid problem of 
multiolinearity, we propose  
Z-score = F(MACRO variables, BANK specific variables), 
where MACRO variables ≡ (INF, GDP, EXRate, FDI, Unempl, INTER) and 
BANK specific variables ≡ (DTA, CAP, LTD, FAA, Size). 
                                                          
25 It indicates how the variables are related with each other and also to what extent. 
26 From Table A 4, we can have three principal lineaire relations Z-score=f (ROA, CAP, Size, FAA, 
DTA, and OBSIA), Debt to assets, DTA=f( ROA, CTD, LTA, LTD, and CAP), and Capital adequaty 
ratio CAP=f(ROA, ROE, CTA, CTD, LTA, LTD, and LLR). The simple correlation does not imply 
anything regarding the causality amongst the variables. To find out the causal relationship 
between two variables Engle-Granger (1969) causality test is implemented between variables. 
From Table Table A 7 (see in Appendice), we deduce that Z-score = g(EXRate, NPL), DTA = 
g(ROA, CTA), and CAP= g(LTA, LTD,  Zise). 
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First order Correlation between Z-score and its  previous value is significant and 
equal to 0.9515 < 1. So, we propose the three dynamic panel model which take 
account also of 2008 GFC and 2011Yesameen Tunisian revolution effects : Zscore 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖0 + 𝜌𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝛾3 △ EXRate𝑡 +  𝛾4 △ FDI𝑡 +𝛾5 △ Unempl𝑡 +  𝛾6𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 +   𝛼1𝑀2008𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷2008𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷2011𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
for macroeconomic factors case,   Zscore 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖0 + 𝜌𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑫𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3LTD𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4FAA𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5Size𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼1𝑀2008𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐷2008𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷2011𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (2) 
when utilizing bank specific factors as predictors , and Zscore 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖0 + 𝜌𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝛾3 △ EXRate𝑡 + 𝛾4 △ FDI𝑡 +𝛾5 △ Unempl𝑡 +  𝛾6𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3LTD𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4FAA𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽5Sizel𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼1𝑀2008𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐷2008𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷2011𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                               (3) 
if both factors are considered, where dummy variables are D2008t = 1 if t = year > 2008 and zero if not D2011t = 1 if t = year > 2011 and zero if not. 
In addition to D2008, these models include an interaction between D2008 and 𝑀𝑖 (𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑀2008𝑖,𝑡) 𝑀2008𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝐷2008𝑡 , 
where 𝑀𝑖 = 1 if Bank i is Interest free and zero if not. 
The idea is that GFC might have a different effects for Islamic and Conventional 
banks. Effect of Yesameen 2011 tunisian revolution  is also to be analysed via 𝐷2011𝑡. 
IV. Empirical Results 
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We consider three alternative estimation techniques. The first one is the fixed 
effects method ≡ FE ( the second : GLS for random effect ≡ RE model)27 for 
fixed effect model which  controll for unobserved heterogeneity across banks. 
While these approaches are rather simple and intuitive, they may give rise to 
“dynamic panel bias” which results from the possible endogeneity of the lagged 
variable and the fixed effects in the error term. This can be avoided by applying a 
third method : the “system GMM” developed by (Arellano & Bover, 1995) and 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998) which give more precise results than : “difference 
GMM” method of (Arellano & Bond, 1991) which transforms the data to first 
differences to remove the fixed effect element and uses the lagged levels of the 
right hand-side variables as instruments.28  
The results presented in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 broadly confirm that both 
bank-level and macroeconomic factors play a role in affecting the banks’ stability 
quality in the short term. All time (years) dummies were excluded since they 
were jointly statistically equal to zero, implying that controlling for unobserved 
factors varying across time is not necessary in these models. 
From Table 3, our analyses do generally provide significant support for the 
impact of macroeconomic factors. For Inflation (and exchange rate), we find 
strong statistical and economic evidence of its negative (depreciation) impact on 
financial stability. While for FDI (and interest rate), we find strong statistical 
and economic evidence of its positive impact on financial stability. However, for 
income (GDPG), we do not find strong statistical and economic  evidence of its 
negative impact on financial stability.29 
                                                          
27 Selection is made by Hausmn test.  FE and RE results are presented only for reference. 
28 We used a robust regression estimation method to handle the presence of outliers.  
 
29
 This is not in line with  previous research (e.g. (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013); (Čihák & Hesse, 
2010);  Maghyereh & Awartani, 2014) suggesting that this might be owing to the lack of 
experience in non-traditional activity. 
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From Table 4, size is found to have a highly statistical and economic significance 
in Tunisian Banks, which is consistent with a large and growing literature on 
economies of scale. Previous period’s DTA as a measure of better liquidity 
performance of the bank’s management leads to higher Z-scores, while higher 
risk ratios loans to deposits (LTD) leads to lower Z-scores (destabilising tunisian 
banks).  
From Table 5, Capital ratios (CAP) as a proxy for asset quality is found to be 
statistically significant and play a greater role in stabilising tunisian banks. 
If we look at GFC effect, we conclude that GFC has a significant positive effect 
for Conventional banks equal to 57.472263 from Table 5 (and for both type of 
banks equal to 64.58454 from Table 3), while for Interest free banks, GFC has a 
significant negative  effect equal to -8.641213 from Table 4 (positive effect equal 
to 51.638295 = 57.472263 - 5.8339681 from Table 5). 
If we look at 𝐃𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒕 effect, we conclude that 2011 Yesameen tunisian 
revolution has a significant positive effect on tunisian bank stability, see Table 3 
and Table 5. 
In all cases, the Hansen/Sargan-test suggests that the instruments used are 
uncorrelated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond tests rejects the hypothesis 
that the errors are not autocorrelated in the first order (AR(1)), but cannot reject 
this hypothesis for the second order (AR(2)). 
Table 3 : Macroeconomic effects on Z-score dynamic [Model (1)] 
Variable FE30    RE    1step sys GMM    
Zscore-1 
.84691556*** 1.0017942*** 1.0324742*** 
INF -50.14932*** -53.211239*** -53.59863*** 
GDPG -3.3608955*   -1.2795811    -1.4092755    
△EXRate -363.04223*** -359.13553*** -363.0903*** 
                                                          
 
30
 F test that all u_i=0: F(15, 79) = 1.30, Prob > F = 0.2250. 
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△FDI 5.3880651*** 5.9807867*** 6.014778*** 
△unempl -6.5402851*** -4.2927565*** -4.4939179*** 
INTER 8.1767817*** 8.1914136*** 8.2807255*** 
M2008 1.3636137    .36757083    3.377796    
D2011 42.761998*** 52.900162*** 52.682976*** 
D2008 59.44231*** 64.376101*** 64.58454*** 
_cons 129.38052*** 123.54132*** 124.04162*** 
N 105    105    105    
R2 .81454372            
F/Wald 34.697641    2468.71    2716.264    
Hausman  3.68(0.9607)  
AR(1)   0.058 
AR(2)   0.745 
Hansen/Sargan   1.000 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note : p-values are reported for Sargan/Hansen test, Hausman test, and 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests.  F/Wald  is Fisher or Wald global significant test statistic. AR(1) statistic is the Arellano-
Bond tests for first ordrer autocorrelation and AR(2) statistic for second order autocorrelation. 
Table 4: Bank specific effects on Z-score dynamic [Model(2)] 
Variable FE RE 1step sys GMM    
Zscore-1 
.08217912    .89212804*** .88416272*** 
DTA-1 
-4.7781874    -29.592022*** -33.919968*   
CAP 156.90206*** 41.120976*** 49.949983    
LTD -9.498089*** 7.043302*** 8.794938*** 
FAA -60.091166    -272.5567*** -373.01549*** 
size -17.5051*** -3.4597908**  -4.01235**  
M2008 -.28272989    -6.7350631*   -8.641213*   
D2008 2.5945615**  1.9826747    2.5824434    
D2011 .9407625    -3.6115424    -3.282941    
_cons 69.294019*** 9.1131958    10.347462    
N 91    91    91    
R2 .88620059            
F/Wald 57.972806    759.77    535.06078    
Hausman 68.15(0.000)   
AR(1)   0.062 
AR(2)   0.281 
Hansen/Sargan   1.00 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note : p-values are reported for Sargan/Hansen test, Hausman test, and 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests.  F/Wald  is Fisher or Wald global significant test statistic. AR(1) statistic is the Arellano-
Bond tests for first ordrer autocorrelation and AR(2) statistic for second order autocorrelation. 
Table 5: All factors effects on Z-score dynamic [Model(3)] 
Variable FE31    RE 1step sys GMM 
Zscore-1 .23711144**  .96663084*** .93675876*** 
DTA-1 
-1.7699883    -13.334444**  -23.413986**  
                                                          
31 F test that all u_i=0: F(14, 61) = 7.91, Prob > F = 0.0000. 
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CAP 126.52989*** 14.756346    40.640876*   
LTD -2.3295778    3.8254102**  5.7151984**  
INF -17.814852*** -50.61256*** -46.70228*** 
GDPG -5.0984119*** -1.4185829    -1.0855176    
△EXRate -170.52393*** -341.95911*** -310.39275*** 
△FDI 1.1803155    5.6670494*** 5.1615539*** 
△unemploy -6.6580644*** -4.1780588**  -3.5275304*** 
INTER 3.3926306*** 7.7963717*** 6.9811443*** 
FAA -96.002197    -198.18201*** -340.26867**  
size -12.758881*** -.22298877    -1.223107    
M2008 2.0616331    -3.4714485    -5.8339681**  
D2011 7.3502955    50.740322*** 48.352293*** 
D2008 20.317987**  61.599965*** 57.472263*** 
_cons 109.6477*** 119.6465*** 112.56826*** 
N 91    91    91    
R2 .93149857            
F/Wald 55.299495    1940.00    49466.416    
Hausman 169.91(0.00)   
AR(1)   0.051 
AR(2)   0.301 
Hansen/Sargan   1.000 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note : p-values are reported for Sargan/Hansen test, Hausman test, and 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests.  F/Wald  is Fisher or Wald global significant test statistic. AR(1) statistic is the Arellano-
Bond tests for first ordrer autocorrelation and AR(2) statistic for second order autocorrelation. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The first aim of the current paper was to compare between the features of Interest 
free banks (IB) and conventional banks (CB) in Tunisia using selected financial 
ratios. We show that Interest free and conventional banks behave somewhat 
differently. Based on Z-scores, mean tests results show that in the long term, CB 
are more stable than IB, supporting the second line of argument suggesting that 
IB are riskier than CB.32 Also, we find that IB have better liquidity  and have more 
credit risk than their conventional peers.  
Based on dynamic regression models, in the short run, we finds that Z-scores 
are sensitive to bank-level factors. Better liquidity performance of the bank’s 
                                                          
32 The difference remains significant for the large banks group as well as for small banks 
compared to small conventional banks. Large Islamic banks are slightly more stable than small 
Islamic banks and large conventional banks are more stable than small conventional banks. 
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management, as measured by the previous period’s DTA, and Capital ratios, as a 
proxy for asset quality, are found to be statistically significant and play a greater 
role in stabilising tunisian banks (lead to higher Z-scores), while The risk ratios 
suggesting greater risk [more loans or equivalents relative to deposits (LTD)] for 
Tunisian banks leads to lower Z-scores (destabilise tunisian banks).  
While the paper’s main findings remain robust for alternative specifications and 
time periods, they should be treated with caution as they are subject to caveats, 
including those that arise from the Z-score’ data quality. With this in mind, the 
paper finds also that, the level of Z-scores can be attributed to both 
macroeconomic conditions and banks’ specific factors.33 Beyond the Bank-
specific effects, the results confirm that the level of Z-scores tends to increase 
when Interest rate (INTER) and Foreign direct investment (FDI) rise. While 
instability increase when unemployment rises, exchange rate depreciates, and 
inflation is high.  
In regard to economic turmoil, the difference between the two banking types was 
significant post the 2008 GFC and post 2011 Yesameen Revolution.  
 The current research may be extended by investigating other features of banks 
such as business model and efficiency. Further, the question of whether Interest 
free and conventional banks have or not the same behavior when operating on a 
small or large scale should be explored in future research.  
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Appendice 
Tables 
Table A 1 : List of Tunisian banks (with code) 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
 40 Banque Internt Arabe Tunisi,  
 41 Banque Nationale Agricole,  
 42 Société Tunisienne de Bank,  
 43 Amen Bank,  
 44 Banque de l'Habitat,  
 45 Attijari Bank,  
 46 Arab Tunisian Bank,  
 47 Banque de Tunisie,  
 48 Union Internl de Banque,  
 49 Union Bancaire  Comrce et 
l'Industrie, 
 50 North Africa International Bank – 
NAIB,  
 51 Arab Banking Corporation – Tunisie,  
 53 Alubaf International Bank, 
 54 Banque Franco-Tunisienne,  
 
 39 Albaraka Bank Tunisia, 34 
 52 Banque Zitouna35 
 
                                                          
34 “Al Baraka Bank Tunisia” is launched in June 1983. At the end of 2012, “Al Baraka Bank Tunisia” became a 
resident bank (Taktak & Zouari, 2014). 
35 “Zitouna Bank” is a universal commercial bank and is initiated in May 2010 (Taktak & Zouari, 2014). 
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Table A 2: Existing empirical literature 
Authors  Sample Methodology Variables Main results 
(Metwally, 1997) 15 Isl. banks 15 
conv. banks 1992– 
1994 
Logit model Probit 
model Descriminant 
analysis 
Liquidity: cash to deposits Leverage: deposits to 
assets; equity to assets Credit risk: funds channeled 
to direct investments to loanable funds; loans used to 
finance durable to total loans; personal loans to total 
loans Profitability: gross income to assets; average 
return on deposits Efficiency ratios: operating 
expenses to assets 
The two groups of banks may be differentiated in 
terms of liquidity, leverage and credit risk, but 
not in terms of profitability and efficiency 
(Iqbal, 2001) 12 conv. banks 12 
Isl. banks 1990– 
1998 
T-test for equality of 
means 
Profitability: return on asset (ROA); return on equity 
(ROE) Bank capital: capital to assets. Liquidity: 
cash and accounts with banks to total deposits. 
Deployment ratio: total investment to total equity 
and total deposits. Efficiency: cost to income ratio 
Islamic banks are better capitalized and more 
profitable than conventional banks 
(Olson & Zoubi, 2008) 28 conv. banks 16 
Isl. banks GCC 
region 2000– 2005 
. T-test for equality of 
means 
 . Logistic regression  
. Neural networks . k-
means nearest neighbors 
Profitability: ROA; ROE; profit margin; return on 
deposits; return on shareholders’ capital; net 
operating margin Efficiency: interest income to 
expenses; operating expense to asset; operating 
income to assets; operating expenses to revenue; 
asset turnover; net interest margin; net-non interest 
margin Asset quality: provision to earning assets; 
adequacy of provisions for loans; write off ratio; 
loan to assets; loans to deposits  
Liquidity: cash to assets; cash to deposits Risk: 
deposits to assets; equity multiplier; equity to 
deposits; total liabilities to equity; total liabilities to 
shareholder capital; retained earnings to assets 
Accounting ratios are good discriminators between 
Islamic and conventional banks. Islamic banks are 
more profitable but less efficient than 
conventional banks 
(Srairi, 2010) 48 conv. banks 23 
Isl. banks GCC 
region 1999– 2007 
stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) 
 T-test for equality of 
means 
Profitability: net profit to average total assets Capital 
adequacy: equity to total assets Credit risk: loans to 
total assets Operation cost: cost to income Size: 
natural logarithm of total assets 
Conventional banks are more efficient than Islamic 
banks 
(Belanes & Hassiki, 
2012) 
19 conv. banks 13 
Isl. banks MENA 
region  
2006– 2009 
Data envelopment 
analysis 
(DEA)Wilcoxon 
ranksum test 
Profitability: ROA; ROE; net Interest margin 
Liquidity: short-term assets to short-term loans Risk: 
total debts to assets; reserves for losses on credits to 
total credits 
There is no significant difference in the efficiency 
scores between these two types of banks 
(Beck, Demirguc -
Kunt, & Merrouche, 
2013) 
Sample of 510 
banks across 22 
countries 1995– 
2009 
T-test for equality of 
means, regression 
Business model: Fee income to operational income; 
nondeposit funding to total funding; loans to deposit 
Efficiency: cost to income ratio; overheads to assets 
Asset quality: loss reserves to gross loans; loan loss 
provisions to gross loans; nonperforming loans to 
There are few significant differences in business 
models. Islamic banks are less efficient, but have 
higher intermediation ratios, have higher asset 
quality, and are better capitalized than conventional 
banks. 
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gross loans; Stability: z-score; ROA; equity to 
assets; liquid assets to deposit 
(Abedifar, Molyneux, 
& Tarazi, 2013) 
553 banks from 24 
countries 1999– 
2009 
T-test for equality of 
means, random effect 
regression 
Credit risk: loan loss reserves to gross loans; 
impaired loans to gross loans; loan loss provision to 
average gross loans Insolvency risk: z-score Bank 
interest rate: net interest margin; interest income 
rate; interest expense rate; loan rate; deposit rate 
Financial ratio: equity capital to asset ratio; ROA; 
ROE; net loans to total earning assets; cost to 
income ratio; total assets 
Islamic banks are more capitalized and profitable 
than conventional banks. Islamic banks have lower 
credit risk than conventional banks, specifically 
small, leveraged, or those operating in countries 
with more than 90% Muslim populations. In terms 
of insolvency risk small Islamic banks are more 
stable than small conventional banks 
 
(Johnes & al., 2013) 207 conventional 
and 45 Islamic 
Banks across 18 
countries (Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; 
Brunei; Egypt; 
Indonesia; Jordan; 
Kuwait; Malaysia; 
Mauritania; 
Pakistan; 
Palestine; Qatar; 
Saudi 
Arabia;Sudan; 
Tunisia; Turkey; 
United Arab 
Emirates; Yemen.)  
2004–2009 
DEA and meta-frontier 
analysis (MFA). 
Bootstrapping methods. 
Random effects 
estimation approach 
with heteroscedasticity-
corrected standard  
errors. 
Tobit model 
A binary variable to reflect whether or not the bank 
is classified by Bankscope as fully-fledged Islamic 
(ISLAMIC).  
A dummy variable to reflect whether the bank is 
listed on the stock market (LIST) and an interaction 
term between ISLAMIC and LIST (ISLIST). 
The value of a bank’s total assets (ASSETS). 
The ratio of loan loss reserves to loans 
(LOANLOSS/LOAN). 
The ratio of total loans to total assets 
(LOANS/ASSETS). 
Ratio of net loans to total assets 
(NETLOANS/ASSETS).  
The normalized Herfindahl index (HHI). 
The degree of market capitalization (MCAP). 
Per capita GDP (GDPPC). 
Year dummies for changes in banking efficiency 
over time. 
Region dummies for differences in efficiency 
between three broad regions. 
Islamic banks are typically on a par with 
conventional ones in terms of gross efficiency, 
significantly higher on net efficiency and 
significantly lower on type efficiency. 
The low type efficiency of Islamic banks could be 
attributed to lack of product standardization 
whereas high net efficiency reflects high 
managerial capability in Islamic banks. 
 
 
(Ben Khediri, 
Charfeddined, & Ben 
Youssef, 2015) 
43 conv. banks 18  
Isl. banks  
4 Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council (GCC) 
countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia,and 
the United Arab 
Emirates) 
2003-2010 
T-test for equality of 
means, 
linear discriminant 
analysis 
Logistic regression 
Neural networks 
classification techniques 
Five groups of ratio: profitability ratios (ROA, and 
ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD), credit risk 
(LLR, NPL,LTA, LTD), insolvency risk (ETA, DA, 
DTA, and DTE), and asset structure ratios (FAA, 
OBSIA). 
Islamic banks are, on average, more profitable, 
more liquid, better capitalized, and havelower 
credit risk than conventional banks. 
Islamicbanks are, on average, less involved in off-
balance sheet activities and have more operating 
leverage than their conventional peers 
the two types of banks may be differentiated in 
terms of credit and insolvency risk, oper-ating 
leverage and off-balance sheet activities, but not in 
terms of profitability and liquidity. 
Global financial crisis has a time shifted negative 
impact on the profitability for both Islamic and 
conventional. banks 
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(Louhichi & 
Boujelbene, 2016) 
30 islamic bank 
and 87 
conventional bank 
10 OIC countries 
(Organization of 
Islamic 
Cooperation)  
2005 -2012 
one-step generalized 
method of moments 
(GMM) system 
estimator. panel vector 
autoregressive (PVAR) 
model 
NPL, bank size, loan loss provisions, cost efficiency, 
equity to assets,real gross domestic product,  
annual inflation rate 
Results support the“bad management” hypothesis 
for conventional banks. 
Results support the moral hazard and skimping 
hypotheses for both 
banks‟ type. 
Islamic banks behave 
differently to credit risk dilemma. 
 
(Ibrahim, Aun, & 
Rizvi, 2017) 
45 Islamic banks 
from 13 countries 
(Bangladesh, 
Bahrain, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, 
Turkey and the 
United Arab 
Emirates). 
2000-2014 
non-linear relation 
first-difference GMM 
,system GMM estimator, 
LSDVC estimator 
Z = Z-score computed as the sum of bank’s return 
on assets and equity-to-asset ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of asset return; NZ 
= normalized Z-score; Size = natural 
logarithm of total assets; Rsize = the size of total 
assets relative to GDP; Lend = ratio of gross 
loans to total assets; Prof = return on average assets; 
Liquid = ratio of liquid assets to total assets; 
△Y = real GDP growth; INF = inflation; AR = 
activity restrictions; PM = private monitoring; SUP 
= 
supervisory power; CR = capital stringency 
Larger Islamic banks are more stable, at least when 
they surpass a certain 
threshold size. 
 
(Miah & Uddin, 2017) 48 conventional 
banks and 28 
Islamic banks of 
the Gulf 
Cooperative 
Council (GCC)  
2005-2014 
DEA approach, 
Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA), and 
ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression 
technique 
FEEINC, LDR, SFA, CIR, Z_SCORE, LADR, 
EQAR, PLL, ROAA, TA 
Conventional banks are more efficient in managing 
cost. 
Islamic banks are more solid in terms of short-term 
solvency but no such difference exists as far as the 
long-term stability is concerned. 
Operations of Islamic banks are different from their 
conventional counterparts. 
Highly capitalized banks are more stable. 
 
(Doumpos, Iftekhar, & 
Fotios, 2017) 
101 Islamic banks, 
347 conventional 
banks, and 52 
banks with an 
Islamic banking 
window operating 
in 21 countries 
(members of the 
Organisation of 
Multicriteria 
methodology 
random effects model 
Strength index (BOFSI)36 
EQAS Equity / Total Assets 
LLP Loan loss provision / Gross loans ratio 
COST Cost / Income 
ROA Profits / Total Assets 
LIQ Liquid assets / Deposits and short term funding 
ratio 
LNTA Natural logarithm of bank total assets 
GDPGR GDP Growth (annual % change) 
Conventional 
banks outperform both the Islamic banks and the 
banks with Islamic window in the case of Asia and 
the Gulf 
Cooperation Council; however, Islamic banks 
perform better in the MENA and Senegal region 
bank overall financial strength index is influenced 
by various country-specific 
attributes. 
                                                          
36 This index is developed with a multicriteria methodology that allows to aggregate various criteria capturing bank capital strength, asset quality, earnings, 
liquidity, and management quality in controlling expenses. 
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Islamic 
Cooperation) 
 
2000–2011 
INFL Inflation, measured by annual % change in 
consumer prices 
INSTIT Overall indicator of institutional 
development 
CONC Concentration in the banking sector 
CRGDP Private credit by deposit money banks & 
other financial institutions / GDP 
CORR Indicator of the control of corruption 
RQUAL Indicator of regulatory quality 
RQUAL Indicator of regulatory quality 
RLAW Indicator of rule of law 
GOVEFF Indicator of Government effectiveness 
PSTAB Indicator of Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism 
VACC Indicator of Voice and Accountability 
 
Table A 3 : Z-score Evolution 
Year CB IB 
2005 27.84269 .5025719 
2006 30.31671 .4088434 
2007 29.47542 .363595 
2008 30.1782 .3670602 
2009 29.74458 .3599491 
2010 28.93348 3.199474 
2011 30.55912 2.215715 
2012 30.09865 3.89422 
2013 2.513966 2.653184 
2014 2.815631 2.523751 
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Table A 4: Correlation matrix 
 
ROA ROE CTA CTD LTA LTD LLR NPL CAP DTA Zscore 
ROA 1.0000            
ROE -0.1034 1.0000  
         
CTA -0.3542* 0.0175 1.0000  
        
CTD -0.7129* 0.3347* 0.9470* 1.0000         
LTA 0.2378* -0.0858 -0.0343 -0.1414 1.0000  
      
LTD 0.2055* -0.1167 -0.0677 -0.1368 0.7098* 1.0000  
     
LLR 0.1811 -0.1018 -0.2356 -0.2210 -0.0503 0.2440* 1.0000      
NPL 0.1404 -0.1021 -0.1414 -0.1377 -0.1490 0.0726 0.6136* 1.0000  
   
CAP 0.6060* -0.1803* -0.2724* -0.3521* 0.2057* 0.2128* 0.4237* 0.2538 1.0000  
  
DTA -0.5360* 0.0087 0.0877 0.2841* -0.2980* -0.2302* 0.0659  0.0436 -0.4570* 1.0000   
Zscore 0.1936* -0.0874 -0.0863 -0.0404 0.0466 0.0860 0.1523  0.1277 0.3546* -0.2382* 1.0000  
(suite) 
 
Zscore ROA DTA GDPG INF   EXRate unemploy INTER FDI size OBSIA FAA    Share      AGE 
Zscore 1.0000             
             
ROA 0.1936* 1.0000            
 
0.0326            
DTA -0.2382* -0.5360* 1.0000           
 
0.0083 0.0000           
GDPG 0.0217 0.0011 -0.0222 1.0000          
 
0.8125 0.9900 0.8086          
INF -0.0411 0.1008 -0.0538 -0.0610 1.0000         
 
0.6528 0.2675 0.5564 0.4434         
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EXRate -0.0941 0.0850 -0.0819 -0.2686* 0.6860*  1.0000        
 
0.3025 0.3498 0.3697 0.0006 0.0000        
unemploy -0.0047 0.0053 -0.0045 -0.9030* -0.1784*  0.1154   1.0000        
 
0.9593 0.9540 0.9606 0.0000 0.0240   0.1463       
INTER 0.0174 -0.1659 0.0356 0.4011* -0.3547* -0.2632* -0.3193* 1.0000       
 
0.8490 0.0667 0.6972 0.0000 0.0000   0.0008   0.0000       
FDI 0.0507 0.0158 -0.0070 0.5984* -0.0787  -0.4462* -0.5757* -0.0896 1.0000      
 
0.5791 0.8620 0.9390 0.0000 0.3227   0.0000   0.0000 0.2598      
size 0.3026* 0.0069 -0.4549* -0.1301 0.1487   0.1912*  0.1271  -0.0978 -0.1151 1.0000     
 
0.0007 0.9397 0.0000 0.1531 0.1022   0.0349   0.1631 0.2837 0.2067     
OBSIA -0.2999* -0.2527* 0.1013 -0.0655 0.0359  -0.0230   0.0519  0.0337 -0.0810 0.0224 1.0000    
 
0.0069 0.0228 0.3713 0.5396 0.7369   0.8294   0.6274 0.7529 0.4477 0.8439    
FAA -0.2028* 0.0245 -0.1448 -0.0123 0.0769   0.0767  -0.0058  -0.0132 -0.0587 -0.0072 0.3016* 1.0000   
 
0.0313 0.7956 0.1261 0.8918 0.3958   0.3974   0.9491 0.8840 0.5174 0.9394 0.0039   
Share -0.0606 -0.0019 -0.2207* -0.0256 0.2133*  0.3022* -0.0217  -0.0515 -0.0874 0.6775* 0.0796 -0.0584   1.0000  
 0.5072 0.9832 0.0146 0.7793 0.0183   0.0007   0.8125 0.5729 0.3384 0.0000 0.4829 0.5392  
AGE 0.0788 -0.2320* 0.1901* -0.0353 0.0650   0.0734   0.0196  -0.0258 -0.0430 -0.0336 -0.0646 0.4336* -0.1021   1.0000  
 0.3884 0.0098 0.0359 0.6574 0.4145   0.3565   0.8058 0.7457 0.5893 0.7132 0.5452 0.0000   0.2634  
 legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.
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Table A 5 : Z-score and DTA  autocorrelations. 
 
DTA L.DTA   Zscore L.Zscore 
DTA 1.0000  
  
L.DTA 0.9068* 1.0000  
 
 
0.0000 
  
Zscore -0.2382* -0.2691*  1.0000  
 
0.0083 0.0055 
 
L.Zscore -0.2512* -0.2516*  0.9515*  1.0000  
 
0.0097 0.0056   0.0000 
  
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Table A 6: Unit root tests Results ( variables in level).37 
  Z-score 
 
CAP 
 
CTA 
 
 
Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.51600  0.0648 -3.89345  0.0000 -2.25411  0.0121 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  45.1644  0.0614  58.1656  0.0031  47.2569  0.0235 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  70.3316  0.0001  75.6457  0.0000  68.5359  0.0001 
 
  Size 
 
DTA  
 
Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.57745  0.0002 -6.54861  0.0000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  25.7068  0.6900  44.7733  0.0663 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  38.7699  0.1310  47.0672  0.0418 
 
 CTD 
 
ROA 
  
ROE 
 
NPL 
 Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** 
Levin, Lin & 
Chu t* -5.51957 0.0000 -7.95951 0.0000 -12.8326 0.0000 -4.5227  
 
0.0000 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
35.8160 0.1473 50.3903 0.0058 47.3888 0.0125 37.2040 0.0002 
PP - Fisher 
Chi-square 
65.4927 0.0001 58.2293 0.0007 60.0155 0.0004 52.5490 0.0000 
 
 
                                                          
37 Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) for Levin, Lin & Chu t* and Breitung t-stat. While Null: 
Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) for ADF - Fisher Chi-square test and PP - Fisher Chi-square. 
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UNIT ROOT TEST TABLE (PP) 
 
 
At Level 
     
  
GDPG UNEMPLOY INTER FDI INF 
With Constant t-Statistic -2.3590 -2.4960 -0.0010 -2.8446 -2.0824 
 Prob.  0.1761  0.1465  0.9336  0.0900  0.2536 
  n0 n0 n0 * n0 
Without Constant & 
Trend  t-Statistic -0.9789 -0.3336  14.8858 -0.9399  1.1341 
 Prob.  0.2679  0.5361  0.9999  0.2834  0.9182 
  n0 n0 n0 n0 n0 
 At First Difference     
  
△(GDPG) △ (UNEMPL) △ (INTER) △ (FDI) △ (INF) 
Without Constant & 
Trend  t-Statistic -5.2652 -6.0823 -0.0011 -9.1443 -3.6664 
 Prob.  0.0002  0.0001  0.6526  0.0000  0.0026 
  *** *** n0 *** *** 
   UNIT ROOT TEST TABLE (ADF)  
 
At Level 
     
  
GDPG UNEMPL INTER FDI INF 
With Constant t-Statistic -2.3638 -2.4960 -0.0015 -1.5405 -2.0774 
 Prob.  0.1749  0.1465  0.9335  0.4644  0.2553 
  n0 n0 n0 n0 n0 
Without Constant & 
Trend  t-Statistic -1.1435 -0.3646 -0.2189 -2.8735  0.5101 
 Prob.  0.2110  0.5241  0.5758  0.0102  0.8047 
  n0 n0 n0 ** n0 
 At First Difference     
  
△ (GDPG) △ (UNEMPL) △ (INTER) △ (FDI) △ (INF) 
Without Constant & 
Trend  t-Statistic -4.7642 -4.3015 -0.0033 -10.6131 -3.3802 
 Prob.  0.0005  0.0010  0.6477  0.0001  0.0043 
  *** *** n0 *** ***  
Notes: (*)Significant at the 10%; (**)Significant at the 5%; (***) Significant at the 1%. and (no) Not Significant  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 38      
 
Table A 7: Granger non Causality test results. 
                                                          
38  
This Result is The Out-Put of Program Has Developed By: 
Dr. Imadeddin AlMosabbeh     
College of Business and Economics   
Qassim University-KSA    
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Null Hypothesis: 
F-
Statistic Prob.  Null Hypothesis: 
F-
Statistic Prob.  
* GDPG does not Granger 
Cause CTA  2.79800 0.0667 
* LTA does not 
Granger Cause LTD  5.46642 0.0059 
* EXRATE does not 
Granger Cause Z_SCORE  3.62646 0.0309 
 * LTD does not 
Granger Cause NPL  5.89142 0.0129 
 * UNEMPLOY does not 
Granger Cause CTA  2.78056 0.0678 
 * LTD does not 
Granger Cause OBSIA  3.04962 0.0575 
* CAP does not Granger 
Cause ROE  2.80929 0.0660 
 * LTD does not 
Granger Cause ROA  3.63549 0.0313 
 * SIZE does not Granger 
Cause CAP  2.59993 0.0803 
 * LTD does not 
Granger Cause SIZE  7.11832 0.0015 
 * DTA does not Granger 
Cause CTA  3.92784 0.0234 
 * LTD does not 
Granger Cause CAP  7.09437 0.0015 
* ROA does not Granger 
Cause DTA  5.52982 0.0056 
 * CTA does not 
Granger Cause DTA  3.99466 0.0221 
 * NPL does not Granger 
Cause Z_SCORE  9.82628 0.0030 
 * CTA does not 
Granger Cause INTER  3.60796 0.0314 
 * LTA does not Granger 
Cause CAP  7.98165 0.0007 
*  CTA does not 
Granger Cause ROE  3.92582 0.0235 
 * LTD does not Granger 
Cause LLR  3.03018 0.0587 
*  OBSIA does not 
Granger Cause CTA  4.84176 0.0127 
 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 6: Z-score and DTA evolutions by bank from 2005 to 2014. 
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Figure 7 : Z-score and DTA average evolution for All banks. 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
YE
AR
=2
00
5
YE
AR
=2
00
6
YE
AR
=2
00
7
YE
AR
=2
00
8
YE
AR
=2
00
9
YE
AR
=2
01
0
YE
AR
=2
01
1
YE
AR
=2
01
2
YE
AR
=2
01
3
YE
AR
=2
01
4
Z_SCORE for M=0
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
YE
AR
=2
00
5
YE
AR
=2
00
6
YE
AR
=2
00
7
YE
AR
=2
00
8
YE
AR
=2
00
9
YE
AR
=2
01
0
YE
AR
=2
01
1
YE
AR
=2
01
2
YE
AR
=2
01
3
YE
AR
=2
01
4
DTA for M=0
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
YE
AR
=2
00
5
YE
AR
=2
00
6
YE
AR
=2
00
7
YE
AR
=2
00
8
YE
AR
=2
00
9
YE
AR
=2
01
0
YE
AR
=2
01
1
YE
AR
=2
01
2
YE
AR
=2
01
3
YE
AR
=2
01
4
Z_SCORE for M=1
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
YE
AR
=2
00
5
YE
AR
=2
00
6
YE
AR
=2
00
7
YE
AR
=2
00
8
YE
AR
=2
00
9
YE
AR
=2
01
0
YE
AR
=2
01
1
YE
AR
=2
01
2
YE
AR
=2
01
3
YE
AR
=2
01
4
DTA for M=1
Means by M, YEAR
 
Figure 8 : Z-score and DTA average evolution for IB (M=1) and CB (M=0). 
 
Figure 9 :  Z-score and the DTA linear static relation for IB, CB, and all tunisian banks. 
